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This paper examines the relationship between futures and spot electricity prices for two of the 
Australian electricity regions in the National Electricity Market (NEM): namely, New South Wales 
and Victoria. A generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to 
identify the magnitude and significance of mean and volatility spillovers from the futures market to 
the spot market. The results indicate the presence of positive mean spillovers in the NSW market for 
peak and off-peak (base load) futures contracts and mean spillovers for the off-peak Victorian futures 
market. The large number of significant innovation and volatility spillovers between the futures and 
spot markets indicates the presence of strong ARCH and GARCH effects. Contrary to evidence from 
studies in North American electricity markets, the results also indicate that Australian electricity spot 
and futures prices are stationary.  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades an increasing number of developed and developing economies 
around the world have restructured their electricity markets. Starting with Chile, Argentina 
and the United Kingdom, and followed by the United States and most members of the 
European Union, these efforts have entailed a move away from the heavily-regulated publicly 
or privately-owned, vertically-integrated utilities of the past towards more market-based 
structures for electricity suppliers in the present and potentially more competitive outcomes 
for consumers in the future (Crow 2002).  
Australia has also been at the forefront of these efforts to introduce competition into the 
global power industry. Where electricity was once supplied by state government-owned 
entities that had never operated on a national or even a regional basis, and where interstate 
connections were weak and regional electricity trade limited, the market is now characterised 
by the separation of the generation, transmission and distribution functions by company, and 
by a competitive national electricity market across the majority of Australian states and 
territories. And for the most part, the restructuring and liberalisation of the Australian 
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electricity market has been a resounding success. In evidence, the benefits to the economy of 
electricity market liberalisation amounted to AUD1.5 billion in 2000 alone, labour 
productivity in the electricity supply industry doubled in the last decade while capital 
productivity increased by ten percent, and average retail electricity prices are now more than 
ten percent below the levels of the early 1990s (ABARE 2002). 
Nevertheless, in recent years the pace of electricity reform in Australia has slowed. The 
target dates for full retail competition have been delayed and each of the five National 
Electricity Market (NEM) members (NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory) are still characterised by separate transmission companies. Full 
privatisation has occurred only in Victoria. In South Australia private companies manage the 
state-owned generation, transmission and distribution companies under long-term leases; in 
the remaining states and territories they remain in government ownership. The dominance of 
the individual generating companies in each market is also high with the two largest 
generators accounting for seventy percent of generation in NSW, and in most other states and 
territories at least fifty percent. The NEM itself is not yet strongly integrated with interstate 
trade representing only some seven percent of total generation. During periods of peak 
demand, the interconnectors can become congested and the NEM separates into its regions, 
promoting price differences across markets and exacerbating reliability problems and the 
market power of regional utilities. Ongoing challenges remain in implementing efficient 
transmission pricing with a view to strengthening interconnection as a check on regional 
market power and extending retail access to all consumers. 
At the same time, the establishment of electricity futures markets has paralleled these 
developments in deregulated spot electricity markets in Australia and elsewhere. In the United 
States, the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) initiated trading in electricity futures 
in March 1996 with power contracts at the California-Oregon Border, Palo Verde, Cinergy, 
Entergy, Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland (PJM) and Mid-Columbia trading hubs. Though 
these contracts were delisted due to a lack of liquidity in February 2002, NYMEX intends to 
reintroduce improved exchange-traded and over-the-counter contracts on these and other 
commodity markets in an attempt to capture EnronOnline’s OTC business following Enron’s 
2001 bankruptcy filing. In a similar manner in Australia, the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) 
initiated contracts based on New South Wales and Victorian base load and peak period 
electricity in September 1997 and base load and peak load electricity strips based on the New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia electricity markets in July 2002.    
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Unfortunately, despite the key importance of market pricing within and between electricity 
spot and futures markets, very little empirical evidence currently exists concerning the pricing 
behaviour of the deregulated electricity markets in Australia or elsewhere. The short tenure of 
these markets is the most apparent, though not the only, reason. The few studies that do exist 
are then especially noteworthy. Deng (2001), for example, proposed several stochastic models 
of energy commodity price behaviour specifically in the context of a deregulated electricity 
industry. Using a number of models and assumptions [including mean-reversion, jump-
diffusion and regime-switching] Deng (2001) aimed to more accurately reflect the physical 
characteristics of electricity in commodity spot price behaviour models as a first step in 
applying a real options approach to valuing physical assets in the electricity industry. 
An earlier study by De Vany and Walls (1999a) took a somewhat different approach to 
understanding electricity pricing behaviour by examining regional power markets in the 
western United States for evidence of integration over the period December 1994 to April 
1996. The eleven regional markets analysed included California/Oregon, Four-Corners, 
Central Rockies, Inland Southwest, Mead, Mid-Columbia, Midway/Sylmar, Northern 
California, Northwest/Northern Rockies, Palo Verde and Southern California. Using daily 
spot prices collected from the day ahead over-the-counter market De Vany and Walls (1999a) 
employed Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests to first detect the presence of non-
stationarity in both peak and off-peak series for all markets, with the exception of off-peak 
prices in the Northern California market.  
De Vany and Walls (1999a) also applied cointegration analysis to test for price 
convergence between the markets. The results indicated a high degree of market integration 
between these not necessarily physically connected markets, with cointegration being found 
for peak prices in forty-eight of the fifty-five market pairs (87 percent) and all fifty-five 
market pairs for off-peak prices. De Vany and Walls (1999) argued that the lack of 
cointegration in several markets was evidence of transfer constraints within some parts of the 
Western Electricity Grid, though on the whole the study’s findings was suggestive of an 
efficient and stable wholesale power market. A subsequent study by Lucia and Schwartz 
(2001) also used cointegration techniques, though in the context of the deregulated Norwegian 
electricity market and with an emphasis on the relationship between spot and derivative 
electricity prices.  
In an alternative approach, De Vany and Walls (1999b) specified a subset of five of the 
eleven previously used regional markets [CA-OR-NV Border, 4-Corners, Inland Southwest, 
Palo Verde and Southern California] to apply vector autoregressive (VAR) modelling 
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techniques. As in the earlier cointegration analysis, the study confirmed that both peak and 
off-peak spot prices for electricity contained a unit root. The results of separate variance 
decomposition analyses also indicated that during off-peak periods, the larger proportion of 
price shocks were absorbed locally and only a small proportion of the shocks propagated to 
other interconnected nodal markets. Conversely, during peak periods a larger proportion of 
shocks propagated from the originating node to more distant interconnected market nodes (De 
Vany and Wall 1999b: 139).  
In the only known US study concerning electricity futures contracts, Emery and Liu (2002) 
examined the relationship between NYMEX’s California-Oregon Border and Palo Verde 
electricity futures contracts and natural-gas futures contracts (the spark spread). After finding 
that both electricity and natural-gas futures were stationary in first differences, Emery and Liu 
(2002) concluded that electricity and natural-gas futures prices were cointegrated, though the 
characteristics of the relationship depended upon the nature of the regional market, and that 
there was no difference in sensitivity of electricity futures prices to natural-gas prices in the 
two service areas examined. Unfortunately, no published evidence exists concerning the 
pricing relationships between the Australian electricity spot and futures markets, nor within 
these markets alone. This lies in stark contrast to the large and ongoing amount of empirical 
attention directed towards spot and futures pricing relationships in other energy markets such 
as oil, heating oil, gasoline and natural gas [see, for instance, Hirshfeld (1983), Chen et al. 
(1987), Ma (1989), Cho and McDougall (1990), Bopp and Lady (1991), Deaves and Krinsky 
(1992), Serletis (1992; 1992b), Nainar (1993), Herbert (1995), Peroni and McNown (1998) 
and Lim and Touvakis (2001)]  
Accordingly, the purpose of the following article is to examine the relationship between 
the Australian electricity spot and futures markets. As integral parts of the deregulated 
electricity industry, there is interest in such information for the purposes of price forecasting, 
hedging, speculation and estimating the value of generating assets, amongst other things. For 
example, the value of electricity futures markets arise from their ability to forecast spot prices 
at a specified future date and thus provide hedgers with a means of managing the risks 
associated with trade in electricity. In an efficient market the futures price will then be an 
optimal forecast of the spot price and the presence of such efficiency will ensure the economic 
benefits of deregulation. The paper itself is divided into five main areas. The second section 
briefly surveys the establishment and operation of the Australian electricity spot market. The 
third section explains the data employed in the present analysis, and the fourth section 
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discusses the empirical methodology employed. The results are dealt with in the fifth section. 
The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. 
THE AUSTRALIAN ELECTRICITY SPOT MARKET 
The Australian electricity spot market as epitomized by the National Electricity Market 
(NEM) encompasses electricity generators in the eastern state electricity markets of Australia 
operating as a nationally interconnected grid. The member jurisdictions of the NEM thus 
include the three most populous states of New South Wales (NSW) [including the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT)], Victoria (VIC) and Queensland (QLD) along with South Australia 
(SA). The only non-state based member that currently provides output into the NEM is the 
Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme (SNO). The SNO is regarded as a special case 
owing to the complexity of arrangements underlying both its original construction and 
operating arrangements involving both the state governments of New South Wales and 
Victoria, as well as the Commonwealth (federal) government. It is intended that the island 
state of Tasmania will become a member of the NEM pending completion of the Basslink 
interconnector, which will link Tasmania’s Electricity Supply Industry with that of the 
mainland.  
The remaining Australian state of Western Australia along with the Northern Territory are 
unlikely to participate in the NEM in the foreseeable future due to the economic and physical 
unfeasibility of interconnection and transmission augmentation across such geographically 
dispersed and distant areas. Indeed the limitations of transfer capability imposed by 
geographic dispersion within the centrally coordinated and regulated NEM are one of its 
defining features. Queensland has two interconnectors that together can import and export 880 
megawatts (MW) to and from NSW, NSW can export 850 MW to the Snowy and 3000 MW 
from the Snowy and Victoria can import 1500 MW from the Snowy and 250 MW from South 
Australia and export 1100 MW to the Snowy and 500 MW to South Australia. There is 
currently no direct connector between NSW and South Australia and Queensland is only 
connected directly to NSW. 
The NEM was developed and operates under a number of legislative agreements, 
memorandums of understanding and protocols between the participating jurisdictions. They 
include a mechanism for uniformity of relevant electricity legislation across states, 
implementation of the National Electricity Code (NEC) and the creation of the National 
Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) and the National Electricity Market Management 
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Company (NEMMCO) to control and implement the NEM. The NECA is the organisation 
charged with administering the NEC. This entails monitoring participant compliance with the 
Code and raising Code breaches with the National Electricity Tribunal (IEA: 2001: 132). 
Other roles of the NECA include managing changes to the NEC and establishing procedures 
for dispute resolution, consultative, and reporting procedures (NEMMCO, 2001: 28). The 
NECA also established the Reliability Panel in 1997, in order to “determine power system 
security and reliability standards, and monitor market reliability” (IEA: 2001: 132). 
The market rules that govern the operation of the NEM are embedded in the NEC, which 
was developed in consultation with government, industry and consumers during the mid-
1990s. NEMMCO (2001: 4) summarises the rationale for the thoroughness of the NEC: 
The rules and standards of the Code ensure that all parties seeking to be part of the 
electricity network should have access on a fair and reasonable basis. The Code 
also defines technical requirements for the electricity networks, generator plant, 
and customer connection equipment to ensure that electricity delivered to the 
customers meets prescribed standards.   
The NEC required authorisation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to be implemented, as do any changes. Born from the Hilmer microeconomic 
reforms in the 1990s the ACCC is the peak Australian body aimed at enforcing competition 
law. To this affect, the ACCC is responsible for administering the Trade Practices Act (1974), 
which was augmented under the National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms to facilitate 
access arrangements to network infrastructure and the addition of competitive neutrality 
provisions, which ensure there can be no discrimination between public and private service 
providers.  
Asher (1998: 10) highlights the key change to the Trade Practices Act (1974) under the 
National Competition Policy reforms as “establishing a third party access regime to cover the 
services provided by significant infrastructure facilities” (facilities not economically feasible 
to duplicate and where the access arrangements would be necessary to promote effective 
competition in upstream or downstream markets). In addition to the administration of this role 
in regard to market infrastructure, the ACCC is the organisation responsible for the regulation 
of the transmission network component of the Australian Electricity Supply Industry.  
Of the various facets this role encompasses, transmission pricing is the most prominent. 
This is managed by the ACCC on a revenue cap basis, in an attempt “to constrain monopoly 
pricing while allowing the business owners a rate of return sufficient to fund network 
operation and expansion” (ACCC, 2000: 8). The transmission-pricing role is carried out in 
conjunction with a service reliability protocol, to ensure quality of service. As noted, changes 
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to the NEC effecting transmission or any other aspect of the market must be authorised by the 
ACCC. As such the ACCC is responsible for the evaluation of changes to market operations. 
It is the role of the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) to 
implement and administer changes to market operation. 
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) operates the 
wholesale market for electricity trade between generators and retailers (and also large 
consumers). From an operational perspective, output from generators is pooled then scheduled 
to meet demand. The IEA (2001: 134) summarises the core elements as follows: 
The National Electricity Market is a mandatory auction in which generators of 30 
MW [megawatts] or more and wholesale market customers compete. Generators 
submit bids consisting of simple price-quantity pairs specifying the amount of 
energy they are prepared to supply at a certain price. Up to ten such pairs can be 
submitted per day. In principle, these bids are firm and can only be altered under 
certain conditions. Generator bids are used to construct a merit order of 
generation. Customer bids are used to construct a demand schedule. Dispatch 
minimises the cost of meeting the actual electricity demand, taking into account 
transmission constraints for each of the five regions in which the market is 
divided…There are no capacity payments or any other capacity mechanisms.  
The two key aspects required for the pool to operate are a centrally coordinated dispatch 
mechanism and operation of the ‘spot market’ process. As the market operator, NEMMCO 
coordinates dispatch to “balance electricity supply and demand requirements” (NEMMCO, 
2001: 3), which is required because of the instantaneous nature of electricity, and the spot 
price is then “the clearing price [that] matches supply with demand” (NEMMCO, 2001: 3). 
The pool rules dictate that generators in the NEM with a capacity greater than 30MW are 
required to submit bidding schedules (prices for supplying different levels of generation) to 
NEMMCO on a day before basis. Separate capacity schedules are submitted for each of the 
48 half-hour periods of the day. As a result, the industry supply curve (also called a bid stack) 
may be segmented to a maximum extent of ten times the number of generators bidding into 
the pool. NEMMCO determines prices every five minutes on a real time basis. This is 
achieved by matching expected demand in the next five minutes against the bid stack for that 
half-hour period. The price offered by the last generator to be dispatched (plant are dispatched 
on a least-cost basis) to meet total demand sets the five-minute price. The price for the half-
hour trading period (or pool price) is the time-weighted average of the six five-minute periods 
comprising the half-hour trading period. This is the price generators receive for the actual 
electricity they dispatch into the pool, and is the price market customers pay to receive 
generation in that half hour period.  
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<TABLE I HERE> 
An illustration of spot market pricing in the NEM is drawn from NEMMCO (1998: 12). 
Table 1 contains offer prices for six generators (in megawatt hours) and demand information 
(in megawatts) for the six five-minute dispatch periods in the 12:30 trading interval. 
Assuming each of these generators has 100 MW (megawatts) of capacity, Figure 1 
graphically analyses the least cost dispatch for these five-minute intervals. For example, at 
12:05 total demand is 290 MW and to meet this demand the full capacity of the lowest priced 
generators 1 ($32 MWh) and 2 ($33 MWh) and most of the capacity of generator 3 ($35 
MWh) is required.  The marginal price for this five-minute interval is then $35 MWh. This 
information, along with the remaining five-minute intervals until 12:30, is tabulated in Table 
2, which shows the marginal price for each five-minute interval as a result of the plant 
dispatch mix, which is primarily dependant on the level of demand. The pool price for the 
12:30 trading interval is the average of these six five-minute marginal prices.  
<TABLE II HERE> 
The spot pricing procedure, while bringing balance between supply and demand, can 
expose participants to significant variation. This is owing to the dependence of the pool 
process on generator bidding strategies [for instance, Brennan et al. (1998) highlight the 
potential for holders of large generating portfolios to bid non-competitively in order to 
exercise market power] and the impact of the complex interaction of supply and demand 
factors on pricing. As such the spot price can be volatile, leading to large financial exposure. 
The occurrence of various phenomenon in the NEM have seen instances of high spot prices, 
and in some cases the maximum price cap for the NEM (Value of Lost Load) has been 
triggered.  
<FIGURE I HERE> 
Events in the past, which have had a tendency to drive NEM prices toward the upper end 
of the price spectrum, are of three types. First, prices can increase dramatically when a 
generation plant ‘trips’ or ‘falls over’, rendering it inoperable and forcing the plant’s 
contributed capacity to be removed from the bid stack. This is particularly the case if the plant 
provides base load output. Secondly, abnormal environmental temperatures drive demand up 
as customers increase demand for cooling or heating technology. Higher demand requires 
more generation to balance the system, which means plant bidding in at a higher price level 
on the least-cost merit order are sequentially dispatched to meet the additional demand. Third, 
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technical constraints or faults with the systems design can also lead to higher prices. These 
three instances combined to cause an electricity supply crisis for Victoria in February 2000, as 
profiled by the IEA (2001: 123): 
The Victorian outages reflected a combination of unusual circumstances, 
including an industrial dispute, which had taken around 20 per cent of generating 
capacity off line, two unplanned generator outages, and an extremely high peak 
demand caused by a heat wave across southeastern Australia. The situation was 
exacerbated by Victorian government intervention to introduce a price cap and 
establish consumption restrictions, which prolonged the shortages and distorted 
market responses…The mandatory consumption restrictions introduced by the 
Victorian government over six days lowered demand in Victoria and had the 
perverse effect of electricity flowing from Victoria into New South Wales and 
South Australia while the restrictions were in place.    
The illustration of NEMMCO’s dispatch and spot pricing methodology highlights the inherent 
volatility of the spot price, which can lead to large variations in financial exposure. This is 
owing to the dependence of the pool process on both generator bidding strategies and the 
impact of the complex interaction of supply and demand factors on pricing. In a competitive 
electricity market, prices are inherently volatile as demand varies widely both within a day or 
week and across seasons within a year. Electricity consumption is difficult to predict and the 
lack of real-time pricing means demand is not very responsive to price changes. Further, the 
ability to quickly increase production beyond installed capacity is limited, and the high cost of 
idle capacity and the lack of economical storage, along with the fact that demand and supply 
must be continuously balanced to meet certain physical supply quality requirements 
(frequency, voltage and stability) together imply that prices reflect the underlying volatility in 
the cost of supplying electricity (ABARE 2002).  
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The data employed in the study are daily spot and futures prices for electricity in the New 
South Wales and Victoria regional markets and encompass the period 1 April 1999 to 31 
December 2001. Spot price data is obtained from the National Electricity Market Company 
(NEMMCO, 2002) originally on a half-hourly basis representing 48 trading intervals in each 
24-hour period. Following Lucia and Schwartz (2001) a series of daily arithmetic means is 
drawn from the trading interval data with prices calculated in Australian dollars per megawatt 
hours (Mwh).  Although such treatment entails the loss of at least some ‘news’ impounded in 
the more frequent trading interval data, daily averages play an important role in electricity 
markets, particularly in the case of financial contracts. De Vany and Walls (1999a; 1999b) 
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and Robinson (2000) all employ daily spot prices in their respective analyses of the western 
United States and United Kingdom spot electricity markets.  
In order to highlight the different price formation processes in the peak and off-peak (base 
load) period electricity markets and to provide consistency with the futures price series, two 
separate daily average price series are constructed for each regional market. The peak period 
series is formed from the half-hourly trading intervals Monday to Friday from 7:00 to 21:00 
hours. The off-peak period encompasses the remaining Monday to Friday half-hourly trading 
intervals. Categorisation of peak and off-peak (or base load) period prices in this manner is 
identical to that employed in the regional markets and as specified in the Sydney Futures 
Exchange futures contracts. Selected descriptive statistics for the electricity spot markets in 
New South Wales and Victoria are presented in Table 3.  
<TABLE III HERE> 
The futures data used in the study consists of daily closing prices for NSW and Victoria 
base load and peak period electricity contracts over the period 1 April 1999 to 31 December 
2001. All information is obtained from the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE, 2002). The 
contract unit in all instances is 500-megawatt hours (Mwh) of electrical energy and prices are 
quoted in Australian dollars per megawatt hour with a minimum price fluctuation of $0.05 
and a tick value of $25.00 for up to thirteen months ahead. The daily futures closing prices are 
collected from each contract that is deliverable in one month (the most nearby contract month 
save the current contract month). On the first day of the next calendar month it is rolled over 
to the next contract that is deliverable in one month. For example, if the calendar-trading 
month is September, the daily closing prices are collected from the contract that is deliverable 
in October, and on the first day of October it is rolled over to the contract that is deliverable in 
November. While such a specification procedure ensures that the choice of contracts that are 
deliverable have a high degree of liquidity, it also implies that the maximum maturity length 
is two months and the minimum maturity length is one month. Nevertheless, Emery and Liu 
(2002) employ a comparable technique to provide a single time series of NYMEX electricity 
futures prices as does the study of NYMEX petroleum futures spreads by Girma and 
Mougoué (2002).      
Table 3 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the daily spot and futures prices 
for the two electricity markets. Samples means, medians, maximums, minimums, standard 
deviations, skewness, kurtosis, coefficient of variation and the Jacque-Bera statistic and p-
value are reported. The highest spot prices are in the peak period for Victoria and in the off-
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peak period for NSW averaging $43.69 and $40.53 per megawatt-hour, respectively while the 
highest futures prices are in both the peak period contracts for both NSW and Victoria 
averaging $37.91 and $49.99 respectively The standard deviations for spot electricity range 
from $44.25 (New South Wales in peak period) to $179.45 (New South Wales in off-peak 
period) while the standard deviation for futures prices range between $45.50 (Victoria off-
peak period) to $33.44 (Victoria peak period). For the eight electricity spot and futures 
markets, the value of the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean 
price) measures the degree of variation in spot or futures price relative to the mean spot or 
futures price. Relative to the average spot or futures price, New South Wales (NSW) off-peak 
spot prices are the most variable while off-peak futures prices in New South Wales are the 
least variable.  
The distributional properties of the spot price series generally appear non-normal. All of 
the electricity spot and futures markets are positively skewed and since the kurtosis, or degree 
of excess, in all of these electricity markets exceed three a leptokurtic distribution is also 
indicated. The calculated Jarque-Bera statistic and corresponding p-value in Table 3 is used to 
test the null hypotheses that the daily distribution of spot prices is normally distributed. All p-
values are smaller than the .01 level of significance suggesting the null hypothesis is rejected. 
These daily spot and futures prices are then not well approximated by the normal distribution; 
such conditions normally meaning it is necessary to fit ARCH-type volatility models.  
<TABLE IV HERE> 
Lastly, each price series is tested for the presence of a unit root using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Table 4 presents the ADF unit root tests for the daily peak and off-
peak spot and futures prices in the New South Wales and Victorian electricity markets. In all 
instances, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is tested. Analysis of the price levels series 
indicates stationarity for all markets at the 0.05 level of significance or better with the 
exception of the Victorian futures market in the peak period.  This series is stationary at the 
0.10 level. The rejection of the unit root hypothesis implies that the series need not be 
differenced to achieve stationary which is a necessary condition required to avoid spurious 
results. The results lie contrary to previous empirical work by De Vany and Walls (1999a; 
1999b) which found that US spot electricity prices contain a unit root and by Emery and Liu 
(2002) that NYMEX electricity futures are also non-stationary, though this study does concur 
with Lucia and Schwartz (2001) that electricity prices are stationary. 
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VOLATILITY MODELS 
Since the data for the peak and off peak periods in both the New South Wales and Victorian 
spot and futures electricity markets exhibit heteroskedasticity, generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedastistic (GARCH) models involving different lags can be appropriately 
employed to examine the relationship between these markets. Autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalised ARCH (GARCH) models that take into account 
the time-varying variances of univariate economic time series data have been widely 
employed. Suitable surveys of ARCH modeling in general and its widespread use in finance 
applications may be found in Bera and Higgins (1993) and Bollerslev et al. (1992) 
respectively. Pagan (1996) also contains discussion of developments in this expanding 
literature. 
The following conditional equation accommodates the spot market’s price and the price of 
the futures market maturing in two months time: 
t tt εFS ++= +221 αα  (1) 
where St is an n × 1 vector of the natural logarithm of the daily spot prices at time t and Ft+2 is 
an n × 1 vector of the natural logarithm of the daily futures prices that matures in two months 
time, εt is the random error or innovation at time t, α1 represent long-term drift coefficient and 
α2 is the degree of mean spillover effect across markets, or put differently, whether the 
current price of the futures market can be used to predict the spot price (two months in 
advance). The conditional variance equation is denoted as: 
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where ω is the mean, the sum of the βj’s is the news about the degree of innovation from the 
previous periods (ARCH terms), the sum of the γj’s is the previous period’s forecast volatility 
spillover effects (GARCH terms) and the aggregation of β’s and γ’s coefficients measures the 
degree of persistence in volatility. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the New South Wales and Victorian peak 
period conditional mean price equations for electricity are presented in Table 5. Four different 
GARCH(p,q) models are estimated, ranging from a simple first-order GARCH term and a 
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first-order ARCH term or GARCH(1,1) to a second-order GARCH term and a second-order 
ARCH term or GARCH(2,2). To select the most appropriate specification, F-statistics are 
first used to identify significant models, following which the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SC) select the most appropriate lag structure within these 
significant models by increasing the number of lags until the AIC and SC are minimised. For 
the NSW peak period market the AIC/SC criteria identifies a GARCH(1,2) model while the 
Victorian peak period market is best modelled with a GARCH(2,2) specification.  
 <TABLE V HERE> 
For the two peak period electricity spot markets only NSW exhibits a significant mean 
spillover from the lagged futures price in the GARCH(1,2) model, while for the Victorian 
market while the GARCH(2,2) model is deemed the most appropriate the estimated mean 
spillover is insignificant. In the the case of NSW, the mean spillover is positive. For example, 
in NSW a $1.00 per megawatt-hour increase in its futures price will Granger cause an 
increase of $1.14 per megawatt-hour in its spot price over the two months. On the basis of 
these results we can conclude that there is a linear causality from futures prices to spot prices 
in the NSW electricity market. Such findings are consistent with the established notion that 
futures prices lead spot prices because the former react more quickly than the latter due to low 
transaction costs and ease of shorting. With a commodity such as electricity it is assured that 
the difficulty (read impossibility) in holding the physical commodity by speculators and the 
extreme storage constraints imposed upon hedgers implies that new information will be first 
reflected in the futures, rather than the spot markets.   
The conditional variance equations incorporated in the paper’s GARCH methodology 
effectively capture the information and volatility spillovers between the futures and spot 
electricity markets. Table 5 also presents the estimated coefficients for the variance 
covariance matrix of equations. These quantify the effects of the lagged cross innovations and 
lagged cross volatility persistence on the volatility of the spot markets. The coefficients of the 
variance covariance equations are overwhelmingly significant for innovations and volatility 
spillovers to the spot prices for both electricity markets, indicating the presence of strong 
ARCH and GARCH effects. In evidence, 100 percent (twelve out of twelve) of the estimated 
ARCH coefficients and 100 percent (twelve out of twelve) of the estimated GARCH 
coefficients in the four estimated models for NSW and Victoria are significant at the .01 level 
or lower. The sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients measures the overall persistence in 
the markets cross conditional volatility. Both electricity markets exhibit strong persistence 
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volatility ranging from 0.8967 for Victoria to 0.9861 for NSW. Measures of persistence close 
to one are indicative of market inefficiency in the transfer of information between futures and 
spot markets with the suggestion that the Victorian futures and spot market are relatively less 
efficient than the NSW market in this respect. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the New South Wales and Victorian off-
peak period conditional mean and variance price equations for spot electricity are presented in 
Table 6. Once again, the Akaike and Schwartz criteria are employed to select between the 
four different GARCH(p,q) models estimated, of which a GARCH(1,2) and a GARCH(1,1) 
are found to be most appropriate for the NSW and Victorian markets respectively. Both NSW 
and Victoria exhibit a significant and positive mean spillover from the lagged futures price to 
the spot price. For example, a $1.00 increase in the NSW lagged futures price is associated 
with a $0.77 increase in the spot price over the next two months, while a $1.00 increase in the 
Victorian lagged futures price is associated with a $0.40 increase in the spot price.  
<TABLE VI HERE> 
The coefficients of the variance covariance equations are overwhelmingly significant for 
innovations and volatility spillovers to the spot prices for the off-peak period electricity 
markets, indicating the presence of strong ARCH and GARCH effects. The measures of 
persistence, or the inefficiency regarding information transfer from the futures to the spot 
market range are 0.6598 for the NSW market and 0.1646 for the Victorian market. As 
compared to the peak period spot and futures markets, persistence is generally lower, 
suggesting a greater degree of efficiency in the off-peak markets concerning the transfer of 
information from futures to spot prices. 
Table 7 presents the results of a simulation analysis of the forecasting ability of the four 
spot/futures models selected through the AIC and SC criteria; namely a GARCH(1,2) for 
NSW peak and off-peak period price equations and a GARCH (2,2) and GARCH(1,1) for the 
Victorian peak and off-peak period price equations, respectively. The mean absolute and 
mean absolute percentage errors avoid the problem of positive and negative errors canceling 
each other out. The mean absolute percentage error indicates that futures prices are a 
generally better predictor of spot prices in either NSW market than in the Victorian market, 
while predictions are more accurate in either market for off-peak and than peak period spot 
prices. These results flow from the greater degree of inefficiency in the transfer of information 
from futures to spot markets in general, and the greater degree of information transfer for the 
NSW market specifically.  
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<TABLE VII HERE> 
Thiel’s inequality coefficient is also presented in Table 7 for the four GARCH models. 
Bounded by 0 and 1, when Thiel’s coefficient is equal to 1, simulated values are always 0 
when actual values are nonzero, or nonzero predictions are obtained when actual values are 
zero. The bias, variance and covariance proportions break down the simulation error into its 
components. The bias proportion is an indication of systematic error since it measures the 
extent to which the average values of the simulated and actual series deviate from each other. 
With biases relatively close to zero, the indication is that the models employed do not require 
significant revision.  
In a similar manner, the covariance proportion indicates unsystematic errors however since 
it is unreasonable to expect that predictions be perfectly correlated with actual values, larger 
values of this measure are of less concern. Nonetheless, the indication is that relatively larger 
components of forecast error are associated with unsystematic errors in the NSW market than 
in the Victorian market, though the off-peak market in NSW has more unsystematic error than 
the peak, while in Victoria the situation is reversed.  Unfortunately, the variance proportion of 
the decomposition indicates the ability of the models selected to replicate the degree of 
variability in the variable of interest; namely, the spot price. The large values here indicate 
that the actual series has fluctuated considerably while the simulated series shows little 
fluctuation. This infers that the futures models for Victoria have considerably underestimated 
the variability in the spot price of electricity, and the models for NSW futures to a lesser 
extent. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper highlights the transmission of prices and price volatility between Australian 
electricity spot and futures markets during the period 1999 to 2001. All of these spot markets 
are member jurisdictions of the recently established National Electricity Market (NEM). At 
the outset, unit root tests confirm that Australian electricity spot prices are stationary. A 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to identify 
the source and magnitude of spillovers. The estimated coefficients from the conditional mean 
price equations indicate that the mean spillovers are positive. This would suggest, for the most 
part, that spot electricity prices could be usefully forecasted using lagged price information 
from the futures market. However, innovation and volatility spillovers are also significant for 
nearly all markets, indicating the presence of strong ARCH and GARCH effects. Combined 
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together, persistence in the transfer of information from futures to spot markets is high, such 
inefficiency suggesting that volatility shocks tend to persist and affect future spot prices for a 
long period of time. The extremely high levels of volatility in the underlying spot markets are 
likely related to the inability of simple ARCH/GARCH models to forecast with any degree of 
accuracy. 
This analysis could be extended in a number of ways. One approach would be to estimate a 
system of non-symmetrical conditional variance equations for an identical set of data. This 
would allow the analysis of volatility innovations and persistence to vary according to the 
direction of the information flow. Unfortunately, strict computing requirements did not permit 
the application of this model with the electricity markets specified in the analysis. Another 
useful extension would be to examine each of the electricity markets individually and in more 
detail. For example, while the sample for this study is determined by the period of tenure of 
the National Electricity Market (NEM) wholesale electricity spot markets in the separate 
states pre-date this by several years. An examination of the interconnection between the long-
standing electricity spot markets in NSW and VIC would be particularly useful and 
examination of spot and futures markets in different regions using, say, multivariate GARCH 
techniques would throw further light on the relationships between electricity futures and spot 
prices.  
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 TABLE I 
Generator Offer Prices and Total Electricity Demand per Half-hour 
Generator 
Generator 
Offer Prices 
(half-hour) 
Time 
Total 
Demand 
(MW) 
6 $40/MWh 12:05pm 290 
5 $38/MWh 12:10pm 330 
4 $37/MWh 12:15pm 360 
3 $35/MWh 12:20pm 410 
2 $33/MWh 12:25pm 440 
1 $32/MWh 12:30pm 390 
TABLE II  
Dispatch of Generation and Spot Price Calculation 
Graph point 
price 
Dispatch 
$/MWh 
Time 
demand 
Total 
(MW) Scenario 
Point A 35 12:05pm 290 Generators 1 & 2 are fully utilised. Generator 3 is partially utilised. 
Point B 37 12:10pm 330 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point C 37 12:15pm 360 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point D 38 12:20pm 410 Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point E 38 12:25pm 440 Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point F 37 12:30pm 390 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
The spot price is calculated as: ($35/MWh + $37/MWh + $37/MWh + $38/MWh + $38/MWh 
+ $37/MWh) / 6 = $37/MWh 
 
TABLE VII 
Forecast accuracy for peak and off-peak (base load) period spot prices using futures prices 
Region NSW NSW VIC VIC 
Market Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
Model GARCH(1,2) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(2,2) GARCH(1,1) 
Root mean squared error 0.5004 0.5100 0.5857 0.6124 
Mean absolute error 0.3423 0.2884 0.4089 0.3468 
Mean absolute percentage error 9.3511 8.5221 11.4772 10.3144 
Theil inequality coefficient 0.0728 0.0793 0.0838 0.0960 
Bias proportion 0.0542 0.0002 0.0071 0.0001 
Variance proportion 0.4232 0.6328 0.9408 0.8004 
Covariance proportion 0.5226 0.3671 0.0521 0.1995 
 
 FIGURE I  
Least Cost Dispatch and Generator Utilisation 
TABLE III 
Summary Statistics of Daily Spot and Futures Prices for Australian Electricity Markets, 1999-2001 
 Peak period prices Off-peak (base load) period prices 
 NSW VIC NSW VIC 
 Spot Futures Spot Futures Spot Futures Spot Futures 
Mean 38.9561 37.9142 43.6980 49.9970 40.5343 30.2290 41.8710 30.9687
Median 30.1512 38.0000 30.0981 37.1250 22.7271 30.0000 21.3263 30.5000
Maximum 585.3686 80.5000 1658.6050 167.4500 2368.4990 48.0000 1497.3710 45.5000
Minimum 13.3610 25.0000 4.2003 22.2500 9.6137 22.0000 6.1663 21.5000
Std. Dev. 44.2514 6.6049 81.7951 33.4473 179.4757 4.8580 150.3377 5.6233
Skewness 7.9404 1.6627 13.2834 2.0621 11.7769 1.0241 8.6195 1.3399
Kurtosis 81.4487 10.0602 230.3570 6.7646 140.9607 4.1059 77.0923 4.5694
CV 1.1359 0.1742 1.8718 0.6690 4.4277 0.1607 3.5905 0.1816
Jarque-Bera 1.9E+05 1.8E+03 1.5E+06 9.3E+02 5.8E+05 1.6E+02 1.7E+05 2.8E+02
JB p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: NSW – New South Wales, VIC – Victoria; CV – coefficient of variation; JB – Jarque-Bera.  
TABLE IV 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Peak market level series Off-peak (base load) level series 
NSW Spot  -5.5978*** NSW Spot  -6.5996*** 
NSW Futures  -3.9088*** NSW Futures  -3.0820** 
VIC Spot  -8.0812*** VIC Spot  -7.0738*** 
VIC Futures  -2.5527*** VIC Futures  -3.0073** 
Notes: Hypotheses H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary). The 
lag orders in the ADF equations are determined by the significance 
of the coefficient for the lagged terms. Only the intercepts are 
included in the levels series. Asterisks denote significance at: *** – 
.01 level, ** – .05 level and  * – .10 level. Critical values are -3.4393 
– .01 level, -2.8654 – .05 level, and -2.5689 – .10 level.  
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 TABLE V 
Estimated mean and variance equations for peak period electricity markets 
  GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(2,1) GARCH(2,2) 
  Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
α1  -0.9043 0.2730 0.0009 -0.7998 0.2654 0.0026 -1.2869 0.3319 0.0001 -0.9788 0.3564 0.0060 
α2 1.1637 0.0753 0.0000 1.1474 0.0726 0.0000 1.2891 0.0921 0.0000 1.2074 0.0987 0.0000 
ω 0.0161 0.0019 0.0000 0.0352 0.0026 0.0000 0.0101 0.0029 0.0006 0.0141 0.0024 0.0000 
β1 0.5067 0.0372 0.0000 0.6215 0.0449 0.0000 0.6354 0.0554 0.0000 0.5824 0.0534 0.0000 
β2 – – – – – – -0.5059 0.0540 0.0000 -0.4330 0.0269 0.0000 
γ1 0.5644 0.0207 0.0000 -0.0210 0.0073 0.0039 0.8474 0.0452 0.0000 0.7156 0.0377 0.0000 
γ2 – – – 0.3856 0.0283 0.0000 – – – 0.0901 0.0252 0.0004 
β+γ 1.0711 – – 0.9861 – – 0.9768 – – 0.9552 – – 
R2 -0.0007 – – 0.0477 – – 0.0622 – – 0.0740 – – 
Adj.R2 -0.0064 – – 0.0410 – – 0.0556 – – 0.0662 – – 
lnL -401.8215 – – -389.0238 – – -392.9983 – – -391.0597 – – 
AIC 1.1332 – – 1.1003 – – 1.1114 – – 1.1088 – – 
N
e
w
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
W
a
l
e
s
 
SC 1.1651 – – 1.1386 – – 1.1497 – – 1.1534 – – 
α1  3.3581 0.1093 0.0000 3.3008 0.1226 0.0000 3.3715 0.1205 0.0000 3.5528 0.1212 0.0000 
α2 0.0112 0.0288 0.6980 0.0327 0.0318 0.3036 0.0065 0.0328 0.8426 -0.0283 0.0317 0.3715 
ω 0.0436 0.0040 0.0000 0.0534 0.0035 0.0000 0.0671 0.0050 0.0000 0.0646 0.0059 0.0000 
β1 0.3971 0.0386 0.0000 0.2595 0.0261 0.0000 0.1636 0.0447 0.0003 0.0904 0.0297 0.0023 
β2 – – – – – – 0.4020 0.0591 0.0000 0.4251 0.0025 0.0000 
γ1 0.5630 0.0271 0.0000 0.9639 0.0309 0.0000 0.3651 0.0298 0.0000 -0.0677 0.0130 0.0000 
γ2 – – – -0.3342 0.0156 0.0000 – – – 0.4489 0.0270 0.0000 
β+γ 0.9601 – – 0.8892 – – 0.9307 – – 0.8967 – – 
R2 -0.0258 – – -0.0125 – – -0.0286 – – -0.0109 – – 
Adj. R2 -0.0316 – – -0.0196 – – -0.0359 – – -0.0194 – – 
lnL -572.6627 – – -563.7663 – – -566.2573 – – -545.1959 – – 
AIC 1.6091 – – 1.5871 – – 1.5940 – – 1.5382 – – 
V
i
c
t
o
r
i
a
 
SC 1.6410 – – 1.6253 – – 1.6323 – – 1.5828 – – 
Notes: Mean equation coefficients are denoted α1 and α1; variance equation ARCH terms are denoted β1 and β2; ω is the variance equation constant; variance equation 
GARCH terms are denoted γ1 and γ2; β+γ is a measure of persistence; Adj. R2 is the adjusted R2; lnL is the log-likelihood, AIC – Akaike Information Criterion; SC – 
Schwartz Criterion.  
 
 TABLE VI 
Estimated mean and variance equations for off-peak (base load) period electricity markets 
  GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(2,1) GARCH(2,2) 
  Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
α1  0.6022 0.6673 0.3668 0.5633 0.6307 0.3718 0.4986 0.7121 0.4838 0.5000 0.7234 0.4894 
α2 0.7711 0.1930 0.0001 0.7754 0.1820 0.0000 0.7951 0.2059 0.0001 0.7966 0.2088 0.0001 
ω 0.0910 0.0120 0.0000 0.0972 0.0105 0.0000 0.1693 0.0779 0.0298 0.1751 0.0096 0.0000 
β1 -0.0168 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0156 0.0007 0.0000 0.0121 0.0244 0.6190 0.0046 0.0192 0.8122 
β2 – – – – – – -0.0233 0.0131 0.0752 -0.0196 0.0096 0.0403 
γ1 0.7458 0.0350 0.0000 0.6754 0.2397 0.0048 0.5228 0.2229 0.0190 0.4776 0.3206 0.1362 
γ2 – – – 0.0280 0.2216 0.8994 – – – 0.0393 0.3181 0.9016 
β+γ 0.7290 – – 0.6598 – – 0.5117 – – 0.5019 – – 
R2 0.0501 – – 0.0535 – – 0.0601 – – 0.0528 – – 
Adj.R2 0.0448 – – 0.0468 – – 0.0317 – – 0.0448 – – 
lnL -539.9128 – – -532.4653 – – -542.4088 – – -544.4601 – – 
AIC 1.5179 – – 1.4999 – – 1.5276 – – 1.5361 – – 
N
e
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o
u
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SC 1.5497 – – 1.5381 – – 1.5658 – – 1.5807 – – 
α1  1.7666 0.4966 0.0004 1.6672 0.5107 0.0011 1.7368 0.5381 0.0012 1.8055 0.5590 0.0012 
α2 0.4065 0.1435 0.0046 0.4301 0.1481 0.0037 0.4155 0.1557 0.0076 0.3946 0.1615 0.0145 
ω 0.3496 0.0131 0.0000 0.2669 0.0328 0.0000 0.0375 0.0040 0.0000 0.0443 0.0056 0.0000 
β1 0.2390 0.0832 0.0041 0.0771 0.0183 0.0000 0.2944 0.0207 0.0000 0.2642 0.0120 0.0000 
β2 – – – – – – -0.2793 0.0161 0.0000 -0.2481 0.0124 0.0000 
γ1 -0.0744 0.0261 0.0043 -0.2441 0.0601 0.0000 0.8925 0.0139 0.0000 0.8963 0.0215 0.0000 
γ2 – – – 0.4779 0.0317 0.0000 – – – -0.0226 0.0152 0.1376 
β+γ 0.1646 – – 0.3108 – – 0.9076 – – 0.8898 – – 
R2 0.0118 – – 0.0102 – – 0.0118 – – 0.0117 – – 
Adj. R2 0.0062 – – 0.0032 – – 0.0049 – – 0.0034 – – 
lnL -651.0194 – – -647.1888 – – -629.8775 – – -629.5492 – – 
AIC 1.8274 – – 1.8195 – – 1.7712 – – 1.7731 – – 
V
i
c
t
o
r
i
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SC 1.8592 – – 1.8577 – – 1.8095 – – 1.8177 – – 
Notes: Mean equation coefficients are denoted α1 and α1; variance equation ARCH terms are denoted β1 and β2; ω is the variance equation constant; variance equation 
GARCH terms are denoted γ1 and γ2; β+γ is a measure of persistence; Adj. R2 is the adjusted R2; lnL is the log-likelihood, AIC – Akaike Information Criterion; SC – 
Schwartz Criterion.  
 
